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Abstract.  This article identifies problematic attributions in a statement by Psychologists for Social 
Responsibility on the United States-led military intervention in Iraq. 
 
Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR) has recently Issued Statement on the Iraq War (April 11, 
2003) that is intended to be “distribute(d) as widely as possible,” “useful in public dialogue,” and “a 
basis for….discussions with legislators, colleagues, (and) friends.”  The statement’s focus is on “concrete 
steps with regard to post-war Iraq.” 
 
As with any statement Issued by an advocacy group of socially sanctioned professionals, one is quickly 
confronted with at least four assumptions.  First, the statement may yield an accurate opinion of some 
situation based on some alleged special knowledge stemming from the alleged expertise that is the 
essence of a group’s professional identity.  Second, the statement may yield an accurate opinion of 
some situation based on some alleged special knowledge stemming not from the alleged essential 
expertise of the professional group but on other alleged traits or characteristics of that group--e.g., 
intelligence, human compassion, or a cornering of the market on the Truth and the Good as they apply 
across the board or to a specific commodity such values related to violence.  Third, both alleged 
essential expertise and other alleged traits and characteristics might be linked to accuracy.  Fourth, the 
professional identification of the advocacy group might be a tip off that the advocacy position is to be 
disbelieved, discounted, or even perceived as irrelevant to or the converse of what is accurate. At Issue 
in the present article are attributions bearing on the assumption that some special psychological 
knowledge may inform the PsySR advocacy that is clearly oppositional to the United States (US)-led 
military intervention in Iraq and US Government (USG) plans for its aftermath.  This Issue is important in 
that the very name PsySR reinforces an inference that the advocacy group members have special expert 
knowledge about people, that this knowledge is being applied in a socially responsible fashion, and that 
opponents of PsySR may have neither equal or equivalent expertise and a socially responsible penchant.  
What follows, then, is a commentary on attributions taken from the PsySR document. 
 
The Bush administration’s “so-called preemptive strike on Iraq.”  This attribution seems to imply that 
either there has been no preemptive war or that a preemptive war did not need to occur.  As to the 
former, because there has been and is a war, one might assume that it has not been preemptive but 
something else of a proactive or even a reactive nature.  Many of these other possibilities could still 
support the morality, ethics, and legality of the war--unless all war would essentially be immoral, 
unethical, and illegal.  This latter possibility may be the case, but the special psychological knowledge to 
support it is not being made. 
 
As to the implication that a preemptive war has occurred but did not need to occur, one would, then, 
search for what threat was on some temporal horizon that could be reduced through a war.  That the 
threat was nonexistent or minimal in kind or geographical or temporal proximity might be the case, but 
PsySR does not provide data supporting this and such data, if presented, would not necessarily be 
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psychological in nature. The same is the case for positing that there was a significant threat that could 
have been adequately addressed through non-war means. 
 
The war “was done ... without exploring nonviolent strategies for accomplishing the same ends with less 
damaging means.  It is falsely assumed that this was the only way.”  Although there appear to be many 
possible ends to the war--viz., finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction, liberating a majority 
of the Iraqi people, inducing a democratic Iraq, inducing democracies throughout the Mideast, 
successfully prosecuting a war on terrorism with global reach--the facts are to the contrary of the PsySR 
attribution.  The contemporary historical record is replete with strategies and tactics short of violence 
involving negotiations, other diplomatic activities, inspections, economic sanctions, and so on.  A better 
PsySR argument might involve exploring the USG’s sincerity in implementing non-war strategies and 
tactics and a presentation of facts suggesting differential sincerities within the USG.  Expounding on 
sincerity and insincerity based on the psychology of motivation and intentionality could be one 
psychological approach--an approach not taken by PsySR. 
 
 "Military action has the potential to reduce the security of the United States, erode our basic freedoms, 
and civil rights, and ultimately hasten the decline of US influence for good in the world.”  One problem 
with this attribution is that the same can apply to any USG policy.  Another is that the same can apply to 
not having a specific USG policy.  A psychological point of departure might focus on factors--e.g., locus of 
control, narcissism, authoritarianism, private and public self-consciousness--bearing on the omnipresent 
tension between the civil liberties of individual on the one hand and the collective security of body 
politic on the other. 
 
“Full UN control of the post-war rebuilding process in Iraq should be pursued to thwart claims that the 
US has imperialist intentions in the Mideast.”.  The fact remains that there are state and non-state 
political actors--e.g., adversaries, neutrals, and even some oppositional allies--who will assert that the 
USG is imperialist and worse regardless of UN control--especially because the USG is a member of the 
United Nations Security Council that would largely control control.  Moreover, there are many robust 
examples of social, cultural, economic, and political imperialism that constitute the praxis of USG and US 
individuals, groups, organizations, and other entities that would, presumably, remain.  Moreover, the 
very construct of imperialism does not necessarily suggest noxious intentions and/or noxious 
consequences when making attributions concerning moral and ethical behavior.  Whether specific 
instances of imperialism attributions are examples of the projections of the attributor or of the insidious 
evil of who or what is being by the labeled by the attribution could merit psychological analysis. 
 
-----....“to reverse images of the US as a country that is unable to cooperate with other countries, 
threatens force when it doesn’t get its way, and breaks its word in international agreements.”  On closer 
examination of contemporary public discourse, one might better claim to be concerned about the USG 
cooperating when it sees it in its interest to do so--and otherwise not cooperating.  Such realpolitik 
certainly can be attacked, but one would need to attack it through contrasting the intentional and/or 
consequential aspects of other conceptions of appropriate foreign policy--perhaps through an applied 
behavioral analysis.  Of course, if political actors such as PsySR repeat the concern of not being able to 
cooperate with other countries frequently enough and regardless of the actual actions of the target 
towards which attributions are being made, the concern certainly may become a an even more robust 
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The same sort of analysis can be applied to the attributions about using force and about breaking its 
word.  As to the former, the core of counterarguments would focus on using force as a means of 
supporting vital national interests as opposed to using force when the USG does not get its way.  Often 
enough, there may be viable alternatives to using force, but to posit viable alternatives always as a given 
would require a psychological argument not yet presented by PsySR. 
 
As to the latter (breaking its word), one can strongly argue that the Bush administration has rarely 
broken its word in the context of treaties, but has rightly or wrongly chosen not to support and to 
extricate itself from agreements apparently supported by PsySR.  Legality and ethics--if not morality--are 
on the side of the USG in leaving strategic defense agreements, not supporting some international 
environmental agreements, and not continuing the Clinton administration’s support for the 
International Criminal Court.  That such decisions may be very bad policy is a legitimate point of 
dialogue--but one to which special psychological knowledge is not being applied. 
 
 “(n)o one who has been part of Saddam Hussein’s regime should have anything to do with 
reconstruction.”  This attribution is a recipe for disaster in two ways.  First, as with most totalitarian 
regimes, there are very few Iraqis who have not been part of the regime.  Second, the exclusion of these 
Iraqis would set up a huge impediment to integrating the Iraqi population into some conception of 
democratic process. 
 
 "The threatened use of preemptive and unilateral military force sends an undemocratic image of the US 
to the rest of the world and fuels the efforts of those that seek to do us harm.”  One can (at least 
arguably) still be democratic and use force whether that force is preemptive and/or unilateral or not.  
Moreover, there are many terrorism experts with empirical data (the intentional and unintentional self-
reports of terrorists) to support the position that it is the frequently non-violent and otherwise (until 
9/11) only mildly violent response of the USG that has fueled and encouraged the efforts of terrorists 
with global reach.  That both violence and no violence (and all acts are one, the other, or a combination) 
may both fuel and deter or defuse terrorist behavior may suggest that only lethal force will significantly 
reduce at least certain types of terrorism.  PsySR has a tremendous opportunity to judiciously apply a 
huge database on the social psychological effects of violence to matters of antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism. 
 
 “Serious attention needs to be paid to reducing the conditions in other countries that spawn terrorist 
thinking and commitment to terrorist acts.”  PsySR rightly cites the need to support humanitarian aid 
and the resolution of other festering problems.  However, many terrorism experts note that the 
common lay perception of poverty and human rights violations driving terrorist motivation is often 
incorrect.  An ongoing empirical research project identifying the motivators of terrorist behavior would 
be a significant contribution from an advocacy organization of psychologists. 
 
In conclusion, one might well make the case that the PsySR statement is one of political advocacy 
masquerading as expert psychology, as opposed to expert psychological opinion on matters, ultimately, 
of life and death.  It would seem that a socially responsible organization would do more to be less easily 
tarred with such an attribution.  (See Buijs, F.  (2001). Political violence: Threat and challenge. 
Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences, 37, 7-23; Butler, J.  (2003). Violence, mourning, politics.  Studies 
in Gender & Sexuality, 4, 9-37; Jacobs, D., & Carmichael, J.T.  (2002). Subordination and violence against 
state control agents: Testing political explanation for lethal assaults against the police. Social Forces, 80, 
1223-1251; Papadopoulos, D.  (2003). The ordinary superstition of subjectivity: Liberalism and 
technostructural violence. Theory & Psychology, 13, 73-93; Psychologists for Social Responsibility 
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Statement on the Iraq War (April 11, 2003). http://www.psysr.org/iraq%20future.htm; Shamir, J.; & 
Shikaki, K.  (2002). Self-serving perceptions of terrorism among Israelis and Palestinians. Political 
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